Tinker Bell in Kabul

Political reconciliation in Afghanistan is turning into something of a joke. A shopkeeper from Quetta (in Pakistan) apparently managed to pass himself off as a senior Taliban leader, accepted bags of greenbacks from Western intelligence agencies, flew into Kabul under North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (Nato) protection for a meeting with the Afghan leadership — only to disappear without a trace when discovered to be an impostor. The plot seems straight out of Graham Greene’s novel, Our Man in Havana. Western and Afghan leaders are now trying to put the best possible spin on this embarrassing turn of events. The Western media have depicted this incident as underlining the fact that the war in Afghanistan is a classic case of the blind leading the blind. But the implications of this incident are graver. And we need to understand these.
An important feature of contemporary warfare is that it is waged at two levels. There is the actual conduct of military operations and its interaction with the political context. But equally important is the “narrative” dimension of these wars. Shorn of jargon this refers to the story lines put out by contending parties with the intention of structuring the understanding and responses of others to the developing conflict. This aspect has acquired salience for two reasons. First, there is explosion of media coverage, reportage and commentary in a variety of formats. The consumer of news has unprecedented choice; hence the need to structure their understanding of a conflict. Second, the United States and its allies are engaged in wars of choice and these wars are increasingly being waged in the midst of populations. It is essential therefore to convince both, one’s own domestic audiences and the people amongst whom the wars are being fought, that the conflict is indeed winnable.
“Strategic communication” is used not just by America and its allies, but also its adversaries. Think of the videotapes routinely produced by the Al Qaeda, or the statements and “night letters” issued by the Taliban. A major challenge in crafting a strategic narrative is to ensure that it is not undermined by subsequent events or information. More importantly, it is essential to ensure that strategy is not mistaken for spin. Systematic attempts at deception can easily turn into self-deception as well.
The case of the Taliban impostor is symptomatic of these problems. For the past few weeks, Western media was abuzz with news of high-level contacts between the Afghan leadership and Taliban commanders. None less than President Hamid Karzai and General David Petraeus stated that the talks were on. The impression conveyed by news reports was of an incipient but serious move towards creating a breach in the Taliban leadership and drawing important Taliban leaders to the negotiating table. Simultaneously, there were reports that General Petraeus’ counter-insurgency strategy was paying off. Night-raids and targeted killing of insurgent leaders was apparently turning the heat on the Taliban; hence their willingness to explore a negotiated settlement. The New York Times went so far as to proclaim in a headline: Coalition Routs Taliban in Southern Afghanistan.
Now it appears that both these sets of claims were produced by a combination of slick spinmeisters and their credulous contacts in the media. The Afghan government seems to have been more a victim of its own gullibility. Not so the US military. General Petraeus is keen to assert that his approach to counter-insurgency (COIN, as the American acronym goes) has turned the corner: the Taliban’s momentum has been arrested, their forces degraded and the initiative regained. This is essential for General Petraeus to convince his own government and America’s increasingly restive allies to persevere with the war effort. But the evidence from places such as Marjah, where the new COIN approach was employed with much fanfare earlier this year, is far from comforting. The Taliban continues to target any locals who work with the government. US forces continue to be harassed by insurgent attacks almost every day. It is a bit early to judge the situation in Kandahar — not least because of the seasonal thinning-out of insurgents during winter.
The statistics produced by Petraeus’ command on insurgent leaders killed and captured are impressive. But there are serious questions about categorisation and the accuracy of the numbers. Besides, the fallout of the increased tempo of operations is increased Afghan civilian casualties. President Karzai has openly criticised the night raid and special forces operations. Differences on this issue between him and US President Barack Obama came out sharply during the recent Nato summit. The larger problem is that such statistics rarely tell us why tactical or operational successes are not transforming into strategic gains. The US military’s response to such queries is: wait awhile. Such calls will be heard sympathetically in the new Congress. President Obama is likely to go along with this view. He wouldn’t want to be seen as weak in foreign affairs when under pressure on the domestic front.
What does this mean for us? In the short term, the situation might well evolve in the direction desired by New Delhi. US forces are likely to stay on in substantial numbers for longer than Mr Obama’s earlier pronouncements suggested. Indeed, the date announced for a transition to Afghan-led security operations is 2014. This too is not cast in stone. The bigger problem is that the US military (and government) might be misled by their own spin on the fine progress being made. With some exceptions, the media and the bevy of instant COINistas in the Washington think tank community can be expected to provide a reliable chorus. As the war unfolds in both its dimensions, New Delhi should take care to distinguish between fact and fiction — not only in relation to the situation on the ground but also about the developing Afghan state capacity. Only then can we craft suitable policy responses. Keeping our eyes peeled and ears cocked will be critical in the months ahead.

Srinath Raghavan is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi