There is a libertarian ring about a recent Supreme Court ruling which says that membership of a banned organisation itself cannot be construed to be a crime. Going by its own logic, the bench should have gone further — into the merits of banning an organisation and to consider if proscribing a party, including one which does not abjure
violence, is in order. Many have felt over the years that, politically speaking, bans themselves serve no purpose at all. They merely drive an outfit underground and make it difficult to detect and monitor, but are unable to rid a society of certain ideas. Even the Communists have said this about the RSS in India, although the two can be deemed to be each other’s antipodes in an ideological framework. Nevertheless, when administrations impose a ban on a political organisation they find troublesome — and bans have been used across the world, including the United States, the “land of the free” — they merely seek to gain breathing time, without looking at whether in the long run this serves the purpose of deleting a thought process or ideological or political strain from people’s minds. On the contrary, banning a party might give it a fresh lease of life in the eyes of some people.
Perhaps the Supreme Court did not appreciate this aspect, though it should have while considering a complex question that impinges on political philosophy via the notion of liberty. By not considering the question of banning an outfit but only the fate of individuals owing allegiance to one, the court, in an implied way, permitted governments to impose bans on political and ideological bodies. Thus a Ku Klux Klan, or Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, were it to be established in this country, could face a ban if the government so desired. But under this ruling the government would not be at liberty to place under arrest any of its members, including its seniormost office-bearers or ardent advocates, unless they have engaged in acts of violence or instigated others to do so. This begs a question: if citizens are to be judged only by whether or not they themselves promote or instigate violence, or take part in violent activity, then the issue of their associating with a political body — of whatever description — becomes irrelevant. In that case, why did the highest court bother making a specific reference to members of a banned outfit since the nature of an outfit an individual may profess loyalty to is immaterial, and an individual will be judged by his or her own acts alone?
In reality, most outfits are breathing organisations, not unlike individuals, and profess value systems. If they espouse hatred, then violence can potentially erupt due to their very existence because of what they profess. If, apprehending this, they are banned, then it is illogical not to place fetters on their members even if they haven’t committed violence or encouraged it? If society wishes to judge an individual only by his/her actions, then it might be best not to have a category of banned organisations at all. Then we’ll be able to allow anybody to preach anything at all so long as they don’t get down to the business of violence.