Two years after the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the battlefield killing of its supremo Vellupillai Prabhakaran, there is alas little to suggest that the government of President Mahinda Rajapakse has projected any fresh ideas to clinch an inclusive political settlement with that country’s Tamil minority. The closure of nearly a quarter century of military conflict should have given President Rajapakse the moral authority to lead with ideas and action in this context.
Indeed, Sri Lanka’s Northern Province, home to most of the country’s Tamils, does not as yet have an elected provincial council while the country’s remaining eight provinces do so.
Perhaps Colombo is apprehensive that if such an elected body takes office, it would be able to press its case for devolution of powers within a federal structure, or may be something even wider. But it should be evident to a confident Colombo that it is precisely when the broad idea of self-rule within a federal setup is denied that there might be fears of new prairie fires starting. The upshot of this can be the further enfeeblement of the Sri Lankan state when it has just emerged from a prolonged period of sapping conflict. In spite of the sensitivities associated in India with Sri Lanka’s Tamil question, and a natural sympathy for Tamils who live on both sides of the Palk Strait, even at the height of the LTTE’s military and political influence New Delhi always gave short shrift to the idea of an independent Tamil Eelam, and strongly supported the idea of a meaningful devolution of powers within a federal Sri Lanka.
It is to reinforce this sentiment — which makes good practical sense and is also well-grounded in theoretical postulates rooted in the present-day international notion that existing borders should not be sought to be redrawn — that a three-member delegation of top Indian officials led by national security adviser Shivshankar Menon visited Sri Lanka recently where it called on the President and took soundings from different quarters. It is noteworthy that, while emphasising the benefits of devolution, the Indian team did not especially push for the acceptance by Colombo of the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, which derives from the India-Sri Lanka accord of 1987. A reference to the 13th Amendment had uptil now been a part of New Delhi’s advice. In January 2009, then external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee had briefly visited Colombo chiefly to underline the inherent value of an inclusive political agreement with the Tamil minority, especially after the military victory of the Sri Lankan state over the independence-seeking LTTE. In the last phase of Colombo’s war against the LTTE, India had given the former protective political cover against international demands for a halt to the endgame.
In the past one year, President Rajapakse has said he has a particular agreement with the Tamils in mind, but has been reluctant to indicate even its broad outlines, preferring instead that the Opposition parties, the Tamil National Alliance (the umbrella party of various Tamil interests), and the government first negotiate points of agreement. That process is on and the next consultation is due on June 23. Even so, Colombo might do well to indicate that it would contemplate no step that overlooks the “equitable” aspect of any proposed devolution package. In India, leaving jurisdiction over land and police (law and order) to states (provinces in Sri Lanka) has served us well even in troubled times. Colombo might usefully look at this model. In New Delhi recently, Sri Lanka’s foreign minister G.L. Peiris said his government would improved upon the 13th Amendment. That’s a good sign, but Colombo might usefully begin to indicate the first steps in that direction.