Coincidentally, the resumption of the India-Pakistan dialogue through the initiative of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last year occurred about the time that US President Barack Obama publicly broached the issue of the commencement of the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. This imparted a new dynamics to US-Pakistani relations and boosted the morale of the Taliban who, along with their patrons, the Pakistani military establishment, began to look at the prospect of the endgame with anticipation.
And interestingly, when foreign secretary Nirupama Rao will be in Islamabad on Thursday for a fresh round of talks spread over two days, President Obama will have just delivered a key speech a day prior that is expected to explain to American audiences the reasons for the US military engagement in Afghanistan despite financial hardships at home and his decision to begin drawing down troops with a view to creating a basis for a political settlement for Afghanistan that would permit the US to leave, claiming victory. This is important for Mr Obama’s re-election bid next year.
The implication is that Washington is no longer averse to the emergence of a new political basis in Kabul that would either aim to jettison President Hamid Karzai or place him in a subsidiary position vis-à-vis the Taliban, who would hope to emerge as the new rulers with the active backing of the Pakistan Army in strategic and ideological terms. This is hardly a prospect that India can regard with equanimity. This country’s security matrices are certain to deteriorate seriously in the event of the Taliban retaking Kabul. There would then be far greater pressure on Kashmir. Besides, in Pakistan, irredentist elements — in the armed forces, the administration and among the political class — would rise to the top with ease, giving a huge boost to anti-India jihadist congregations. Besides, should the Taliban return to rule Afghanistan (without Pakistan’s navigation skills, this appears impossible), Afghan society and polity are likely to be thrown into a turmoil — including possibly a state of open civil war — on account of the unpopularity of the Taliban as well as the Pakistan state, leading to unsettled political conditions in the neighbourhood that might be difficult to fix if the Islamabad-Beijing axis comes into play. On the whole, on account of what could be in store, when the foreign secretary is in Islamabad, Pakistan’s leaders would be feeling the stirrings of a wider regional politics that would no doubt buoy them. Such a time is hardly conducive to meaningful India-Pakistan negotiations. Ms Rao might therefore be best off being content with a broad review of bilateral ties.
The US troop withdrawal set to begin in July will in all likelihood be of minor magnitude at this stage, and would not have immediate impact on anti-Taliban and anti-Al Qaeda military operations. But the broad political path they will mark is what counts. In the circumstances, India will be required to readjust its sights in the context of Afghanistan, and play the game suitable to its aims in parallel with what the Americans might be doing. The perennially hopeful still talk of a joint India-Pakistan initiative for peace and development in Afghanistan. This is as ludicrous a thought as the belief that the US and Al Qaeda can find a modus vivendi to bring about a reign of peace in Muslim lands so that the West is extricated from the threat of Islamist political terrorism. For India it would be realistic at a time like this to prepare for a political, propaganda and terrorist offensive from the Pakistan side, including inside Afghanistan. We need to talk frankly about such prognostications with all those who matter internationally, but be prepared, if need be, to take hard decisions on our own.