The bilateral relationship between Pakistan and the United States is a fraught one — it waxes and wanes and is characterised by mutual suspicion and not a little hostility. In recent years, the warmth has almost totally disappeared though both realise that they need each other. That the US does not trust the Pakistani establishment was clear from the Obama administration’s decision to go it alone in the operation to kill Osama bin Laden.
Now the US side has fired another salvo, and a deadly one at that. US ambassador to Islamabad Cameron Munter has bluntly said there is evidence to link the dreaded Haqqani network with the Pakistan government, and that “this must stop”. Rarely have American officials been so forthright, though veiled references to the deep connections between Army and intelligence officials and terrorist groups have been made in the past.
It is not at all surprising that the US is angry and frustrated at what it sees as Pakistani duplicity. In the post 9/11 world, America is in no mood to ignore such a double game. Earlier, successive US governments had ignored reports of terrorists operating from Pakistani soil and endorsed by powerful local elements. No longer. US defence secretary Leon Panetta has already warned, in the aftermath of the attack on the US embassy in Kabul last week, that his government will go after insurgents wherever they may be. And now President Barack Obama’s refusal to meet Pakistan Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani during the latter’s coming United Nations visit must also be seen in that light.
It has become almost axiomatic to suggest that Pakistan is bearing the fruit of the seeds it has sown. The various networks operating within the country and on its periphery were set up by Pakistan’s intelligence outfits to spread terror in India and then Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. But these hydra-headed monsters have grown, and today Pakistan itself is a victim of their attacks. Yet the ties between some of the bigger groups and elements within the country’s military-intelligence establishment are so entrenched, and perhaps even so ideologically connected, that it is difficult, if not impossible, for Islamabad to conduct any effective operation against terrorists. America’s so-called war on terror is therefore hopelessly compromised if one of its key allies is not a hundred per cent engaged.
It is now certain that US pressure on Pakistan will increase. With its recent success in killing Bin Laden, the US feels its strategy of going it alone will yield results. As for Pakistan, its government and its military services may chafe but are in no position to stand up to the US, not if they want to keep getting their arms and weaponry.