Drawing a line in the water

Belatedly and hesitantly of course, but definitely there seems to be some kind of proactive movement in India’s approach to establish its geo-political presence in Southeast Asia and equations with the other countries there, in the strategic space overwhelmingly dominated by the People’s Republic of China.
In 2010, when China claimed the South and East China Seas as its area of “core interest”, it placed its maritime littoral regions along the Indian and Pacific oceans on par with Tibet and Xinjiang in terms of national priorities.

At stake are rich resources of oil and gas in the maritime zone, both undersea as well around the myriad shoals and islands scattered in the area. Other smaller nations, too, have claimed their sovereignty over various areas in the same region leading to a conflict of interests with China, and a brewing environment of potential confrontation with the largest and most monolithic power in the region. Vietnam, which has a history of traditional conflict with China is perhaps one of the strongest and often the most vociferous of these challengers. So recently, when India bid and won a contract for oil exploration in two blocks (Blocks No 127 and 128) offered by Vietnam in the South China Sea, China diplomatically warned India about any economic activity in the region which the former regards as its own backyard. But India’s acceptance of the Vietnamese offer (estimated one billion barrels of oil) to be undertaken by ONGC Videsh (OVN), summarily disregarding China’s warning growls, signals for the first time that India is prepared to stand up for its legitimate rights in the region, which also extends to freedom of navigation in international waters for its warships on peaceful passage. The interaction between the two Asian giants has been watched keenly by other countries of the region, such as the Philippines, to gauge India’s response to what is obviously a veiled challenge by China.
Economic exploration in maritime regions is a tricky affair, with imaginary lines across trackless spaces of open sea much more open to individual interpretation, misinterpretation and challenges than land borders, which traverse more solid foundations of a chain of recognisable permanent landmarks on the ground. That is the root of China’s energetic objections to the presence of India — a country regarded by many as China’s rival — in oil exploration activity in the South China Sea, which it regards as its territorial waters.
The issue of maritime exploration and mining rights in the South China Sea must be linked to another incident involving Indian and Chinese interests reported from the same region, this one involving rights of navigation in international waters. The Indian Navy vessel, INS Airavat an amphibious warfare vessel on a friendly visit to Vietnam in June, was reportedly “challenged” in the South China Sea by a Chinese warship which asked the reason for the presence of the Indian warship in the area. Both China and India have disclaimed any knowledge of the incident, but it has been widely reported in the media, and it would perhaps be justifiable to assume that there could not be any smoke, however faint, without a corresponding fire, howsoever small.
In terms of resources as well as geographical proximity there is obviously no doubt about the predominant position of the Chinese Navy in the South China Sea, backed by home bases on the mainland in close vicinity. China certainly has the will to articulate its demands, and is increasingly acquiring the hardware to maintain its strong presence against foreign interests, including fairly potent middle level foreign navies. These realities have been acknowledged in India at a very senior official level, and officials have categorically stated that the “military gap between India and China is too wide to bridge”.
Maintaining a naval position in the waters of the South Sea in the face of Chinese disapproval may not be practicable, though India must face up to the hard issues of maritime challenges further to the west, in the Indian Ocean region.
In a broader context, this rivalry now extends further westwards, into the south-western Indian Ocean, where China has applied for and received permission from the International Seabed Authority for polymetallic sea bed mining. Certain quarters in India have expressed concern at what is seen as expansion of Chinese activities into areas close to India’s territorial waters, though official cognisance has not been taken of the Chinese mining operation. However, all this is perfectly legitimate activity within the international order, and China would be justified in dismissing India’s concerns in this area. A more proactive Indian approach would be to maintain its position by “counter-mining” in the South China Sea, and elsewhere, and build up the wherewithal to do so. In addition India must look to its own undersea mining concessions in the Indian Ocean, on which there has been little or no progress ever since these were granted. It must also be conveyed by conventional and naval diplomacy that the Indian Ocean west of the Straits of Malacca is in the Indian area of influence.
But ultimately, however, maritime diplomacy must be backed up by a strong and well equipped Indian Navy, adequate to undertake the task. Has India put its money where its mouth is?

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament