The arrest and deportation of Syed Zabiuddin Ansari, better known as Abu Jundal, from Saudi Arabia on June 25 was followed by India-Pakistan foreign secretaries’ meeting in New Delhi on July 3-4.

Jundal’s revelations at the Joint Interrogation Centre (where, according to some accounts, he was accommodated in an air-conditioned room, with mutton biryani on the menu) reinforces earlier evidence of the direct involvement of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and other agencies of the Pakistani state in the planning and conduct of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks.
According to Jundal, 26/11 was directed from a control room in Karachi by a “General sahab” of the Pakistan Army, along with some other officers of whom “Major Sameer” had been actively involved in the preparations and training of the designated Lashkar assault group. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) commander Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, and other representatives of the LeT were present in the Karachi control room throughout 26/11. Interestingly, the joint command centre was rapidly dismantled on completion of the 26/11 operation, undoubtedly to remove all incriminating traces of the clandestine activity.
However, Pakistan foreign secretary Jalil Abbas Jilani, speaking at the official press meet at the conclusion of the foreign secretaries’ meeting, brusquely brushed all these revelations aside. Mr Jilani is known to be a jihadi in diplomat’s clothing. He is most remembered in India as the Pakistani ambassador expelled in 2003 for channelling financial support to separatist organisations in Kashmir. His interviews provide a reality check of how Pakistan really regards India. Given this background, the total failure of the foreign secretaries’ meet was a foregone conclusion, best summed up by the cynicism, “So, what is new?”
26/11 was a complex operation, well beyond the planning capabilities of any rag-tag bunch of jihadis. It could not have been organised except under professional military direction, whose footprints are visible all over. The real identities of “General sahab” and “Major Sameer” may or may not have been extracted from Jundal in the interrogation cell, but it is a major failure of Indian intelligence agencies if they have not been able to “break” Jundal. It is the world’s best-known secret that Pakistan has been conducting a proxy war against India ever since 1989. India’s incapacity to launch any effective counteraction is equally well known even if unilateral restraint is politically touted as a noble policy, which has only succeeded in rousing general amusement worldwide, tinged with some degree of contempt.
Against this background, the arrest and deportation of Jundal, undoubtedly, comes across as a well-coordinated coup, reflecting very favourably on the skilled diplomacy, assiduous intelligence operations and effective police work by the often-derided Indian agencies. The ubiquitous “foreign hand” in the form of American influence might also have been exploited diplomatically to influence the Saudi government to participate in the process. Now there are expectations of similar action in respect of Fasih Mehmood, another Indian fugitive resident in Saudi Arabia and a suspect in the 2010 Chinnaswamy Stadium blast in Bengaluru and a shooting incident in the Jama Masjid area of Delhi prior to the Commonwealth Games.
All details about the process of arrest and deportation of Jundal have not been made public, and it is better for all concerned that they remain so. However, the revelations that have emerged so far do not indicate any radically new or different aspects about Pakistani involvement in terrorist activities which were hitherto unknown to the Indian authorities. India has nevertheless persevered industriously with the routine compilation of voluminous dossiers of “evidence”, all dutifully submitted to Pakistan, there to be thrown into the waste paper basket for all the effect they have had so far. India does not seem to accept even now that a purely dialogue-driven engagement with Pakistan on 26/11 has paid little dividend and is not the way forward unless some component of action is also added.
One such option is strong action to disrupt and dismantle the indigenous support base in India to cover Pakistan’s covert activities, whose existence was apparent during 26/11. Jundal’s revelations provide details about the Indian Mujahideen, an alleged network of Pakistani sleeper cells in this country to provide local backup for Pakistani covert operations, in which mafia don Dawood Ibrahim and his D Company are a recurring theme.
The Indian Mujahideen does exist and has to be tracked down and uprooted ruthlessly. However, according to media reports, there has not been much success so far. Moreover, the possibilities of a slowdown or soft-pedalling due to political influences at the local level cannot be entirely discounted.
India has actively tried to cultivate good relations with Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding its traditional tilt towards Pakistan. India is also aware of large-scale Saudi sponsorship of charitable organisations, ostensibly for the propagation of religion abroad, including India. Many such charitable organisations have sprouted in Pakistan too where some, like the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, function as conduits to clandestinely divert Saudi funds to terrorist organisations like the LeT.
Meanwhile, the Saudi kingdom itself might finally have come to realise that the terrorists devour their own votaries and has taken harsh action against extreme fundamentalist organisations within the country, like the Wahabis, who have targeted the Saudi royal family. The Saudi Army and police with ferocity unimaginable in India have ruthlessly crushed religious agitations and disturbances. Massive force has been employed whenever necessary without regard for collateral damage and civilian casualties even inside hallowed religious structures like the Grand Mosque in Mecca itself, as during its recapture in 1979 from the 200 armed Wahabi zealots who had seized control of it.
The Abu Jundal episode may thus be the first glimmer of a new relationship between India and Saudi Arabia for mutual cooperation in the war on terror. If so, it must be assiduously nurtured by both
sides.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament