Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan is not his first to that country. He was there in 2007 as well, shortly after a trip to Singapore. In the intervening years he has travelled to China.

One can look at these visits — particularly this month’s visit to Japan, which has had Mr Modi meeting deputy prime minister Katsuya Okada and a series of business leaders — through three prisms: an individual’s political motivations; a state’s economic engagement; and an emerging trend of diplomacy at a level below that of the national government.
It would be unfortunate if only the first of three prisms got media attention and if the trip were dismissed as the Gujarat chief minister’s attempt to win validation in Asia. True, this is certainly a factor. In going to Japan, Mr Modi is delivering a rebuttal to Western powers such as the United States, the European Union and Australia. They have unilaterally “de-recognised” him even as their stake in the Gujarat economy has grown. As diplomats from more than one of those countries have privately admitted, they have dug themselves into a hole and don’t know how to get out without looking clumsy.
The approach of Asian countries, including democracies, has been different. Mr Modi’s first tour of Japan took place after Goh Chok Tong, Singapore’s former Prime Minister, undertook a private visit to Gujarat, was impressed with what he saw and sought a meeting with the chief minister. Mr Goh then became a sort of mentor to Mr Modi, inviting him to Singapore and facilitating his visit to Japan.
It is worth noting that while Mr Goh has developed such a close relationship with Mr Modi, his predecessor and colleague, Lee Kuan Yew, has had several meetings with Rahul Gandhi and taken him under his wing. This represents a pragmatism and maturity — as a well as an allowance for any possibility — that Western diplomacy would do well to draw lessons from.
Japan and Singapore are not interested in Gujarat only because of Mr Modi’s personality. The Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor was conceived as a Japanese industrial enclave in India. A large part of it, and the bulk of investment in the first phase, passes through Gujarat. This makes the state critical to Japanese economic and strategic interest in India.
Mr Modi’s visits to China have also been telling. He has gone there not as an awestruck business pilgrim, but as a genuine peer from a state whose GDP growth figures either match or outstrip the provincial powerhouses on China’s east coast. Mr Modi’s big achievement in Gujarat has been converting a primarily trading society into a manufacturing economy. To seek Chinese investment in manufacturing in Gujarat is very distinct from trade defined by buying power and telecom equipment or selling iron ore.
Indian chief ministers have been going abroad for years and years. In the 1980s and 1990s, Jyoti Basu used to fly to London every summer ostensibly to seek investment but, really, for a holiday. Other chief ministers have been more businesslike and genuine in their efforts, but Mr Modi is perhaps the first to seek a quasi-diplomatic profile.
He will not be the last. Frankly, given the momentum of diplomacy, the time when the Union government or the ministry of external affairs (MEA) was the sole political and economic interlocutor with foreign governments is now passing us by. This is happening for many reasons. As India’s politics has become more diverse and coalitional, external establishments are exploring broader thinking in the polity.
That is why, for instance, dialogues with groups of MPs or young political leaders — who represent several parties rather than just the party that runs South Block — are now seen as useful. That apart, a parliamentary interface also allows India to subtly project its democratic credentials, without it being seen as part of a Western endeavour. This explains why the office of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha is gradually getting a diplomatic edge it previously didn’t have need for.

In addition, the role of states and state governments as influences on foreign policy is going to grow. Taiwan has a trade office in New Delhi rather than a full-fledged embassy. Some years ago, it sought permission from the MEA to open a subsidiary trade office (or consulate) in Chennai, since Taiwanese companies had substantial investments in Tamil Nadu. Worried about the reaction of Beijing, the MEA dithered. Finally, the Taiwanese asked the then DMK government in Chennai to use its political clout with the UPA.
Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra — though it has slipped from its relative economic strength of 20 or 25 years ago — and to a lesser degree Andhra Pradesh represent coastal states that are particularly crucial to external trade. Manufacturing facilities can ship out products for export; imported coal and energy sources can arrive here and fuel power plants before transmission to the rest of India.
Yet they do not reflect the only model for states that are acquiring a foreign policy profile. Unlike the European Union, South Asia’s economic integration is not going to be a blockbuster, top-down event. It is likely to be incremental, with the sum of the parts making for something larger. Specific Indian states are going to drive closer trade and economic relations with vicinal countries. In the absence of such a buy-in, advance will not be possible.
The case of the Teesta waters agreement with Bangladesh, delayed because of a veto from Kolkata, is there for all to see. On the other hand, the government of Punjab is pushing for freer trade with Pakistan as it sees benefits for small enterprises — not to speak of a neighbouring market for petro-products from the new refinery in Bathinda.
The logical leap would be for Indian states to set up trade offices in foreign countries. Australian and American states routinely do this. How long before we have a permanent Gujarat trade commissioner in Tokyo, or an Indian Punjab economic representative in Lahore?

The writer can be contacted at malikashok@gmail.com