If politics is supposed to be the lifeblood of democracy, it should be kept free of infection. The political process in governance should be for the well-being of the country, essentially to provide for its people’s basic needs and security and further progress and prosperity. If politics becomes an impediment to governance itself and, leave alone basic needs, when it adversely affects the vital tasks of maintaining internal and external security, then need one say any more?

For a problem which India’s top political leadership has acknowledged as the most crucial, i.e. the spread and strength of Maoist-Naxal terrorism, so far at least, politics and weaknesses of the state and Central police have proved to be the two major factors which, leave alone preventing or pre-empting, have led to these terrorists becoming progressively bolder.
While the list of Naxal attacks over the past few years is very long, 2010 has witnessed more frequent and fiercer ones. A look at just four of them — East Frontier Rifles (EFR) post at Sialdah in West Bengal, Dantewada, Chattisgarh and the hijack/detention of a train and the railway track sabotage recently — yet again raise some serious issues about how all efforts of combating highly organised and externally supported terrorist groups are rendered ineffective, owing to two major factors.
One factor is of the state police forces and Central police organisations (CPOs) being distressingly deficient in number, training, weapons, equipment and most importantly, in ethos, which includes conditioning, leadership and motivation. Despite the Supreme Court’s directive to the states for police reforms even before Maoist-Naxal terrorism took off, no action has been taken by most of the states, including almost all the worst-affected ones. Barring Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, where some assertive steps have proved to be effective, the rest are dragging their feet on this issue or worse, are standstill.
The ministry of home affairs (MHA) has, in the recent past, been trying to prevail upon the affected states to increase their police forces’ numerical strength as well as other resources. While planning the same for the CPOs, it has, in conjunction with other ministries, also begun implementation of the welfare and developmental projects, which is a must in dealing with insurgencies.
Well-placed Army sources have denied reports in the media about the Army being requisitioned for anti-Naxal operations or sending its Corps of Engineers for removal of mines. What the Army is doing is contingency planning, which any professional Army should do. And it might as well, since despite denials by some senior leaders about no chance of the Army being used against Naxals, there is no guarantee that it may not be requisitioned for the same in the future. There already is a precedence of the Army being used against the original Naxalbari insurgency in an operation codenamed Steeple Chase in July 1971, which comprised the Army, the police and the paramilitary personnel, and the area of operation were districts of West Bengal and the bordering districts of Bihar and Orissa. So far, the only involvement of the Army has been training some police personnel, as and when they are sent, to its counter-insurgency/terrorism training schools, which even some foreign armies, including the US Army, have availed the facility of.
Chhattisgarh is the first state to raise the Counter-Terrorism and Jungle Warfare College (CTJWC) in north Bastar, headed by terrorism expert Brigadier B.K. Ponwar (Retd), former commandant of the Army’s Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS), Vairengte, Mizoram, now with the rank of the inspector-general of police, who is reported to have opined that the police is not following the basic rules of jungle warfare while fighting the Naxalites.
It is time the MHA-MoD (ministry of defence) divide is spanned and both the state police and the CPOs revitalised by creating more training institutes on the lines of CIJWS/CTJWC and inducting ex-servicemen as well as deputing officers and subordinate ranks to make good the man power deficiencies and leadership drawbacks of the police forces.
Another much required major boost for greater mobility and better surveillance is helicopters, both large and small. There has been talk of acquiring unmanned aerial vehicles, which must be expedited. And, as this daily brought out earlier, the use of helicopters for bringing down fire on pin-pointed Naxal concentrations or camps may prove to be effective in bringing them to the negotiating table.
The other factor is politics, which is proving to be a serious impediment to confronting terrorists. This factor includes vote-bank compulsions, misplaced sympathies, politicisation of the police and bureaucracy, political rivalry and blame game or passing the buck. While this daily brought out this aspect following the attack on EFR, the May 28 railway sabotage near Sardiha, West Bengal, brought into focus yet again how politics can play havoc on fighting terrorism.
While it is widely believed to be the handiwork of Maoists and Maoist-backed People’s Committee Against Police Atrocities (PCPA), railway minister Mamata Banerjee goes overboard by blaming the CPI (M) for the same. Now that her party, the Trinamul Congress, has defeated the CPI (M), it remains to be seen what ensues on dealing with the Naxal menace in the state.
Assam and Manipur, too, are states where fighting against terrorists often became a mockery, owing to strong links between the political leadership and terrorist groups, who even enjoy support of Pakistan’s Bangladesh-based Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The latest surprise comes from Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Omar Abdullah, who is obviously playing to his domestic political gallery by casting doubts on all encounters between the Army and terrorists.
There is enough affinity between many groups within India, some of which have been actively supported by elements, groups or governments of neighbouring countries viz. China, Pakistan (and China through Pakistan), Burma, Bangladesh (including Pakistan through Bangladesh), Sri Lanka and Nepal, for substantial support to keep India on the boil. Maoists/Naxals there have received arms, ammunition, explosives and other equipment as well as training by the north-eastern groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (Ulfa), the Isaac–Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland/Nagalim (NSCN-IM), People’s Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA) and the Maoists of Nepal. At least by late 2009, it got to be known that consignments, of weapons from illegal arms suppliers in Southeast Asia, including a large one amounting to 850 AK-47 rifles, 4,000 small weapons and several hundred grenades, were supplied to the Naxals through Burma and Bangladesh by an elaborate network run in the Northeast by the NSCN(I-M). With Bangladesh-based Ulfa leaders having extended their connections to China, supply of arms from Yunan province of southern China through insurgents in Burma became another new route. All these groups have ISI connections.
Politicising or politicking about security will have to be eschewed and policy formulated between the Centre and states as to who is responsible for what. Finally, nothing can succeed without political will. While the Army must not be used internally, it has been used umpteen times and in the Operation Steeplechase, the result was top leaders being arrested by the police — about 1,400 in Andhra Pradesh, 2,000 in Bihar, 4,000 in West Bengal and 1,000 in Kerala by the first quarter of 1972. The mandate for fighting terror must not be limited, but complete and clear.
Anil Bhat, a retired Army officer, is a defence and security analyst based in New Delhi